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Liar! Liar? The Defamatory Impact of
“Liar” in the Modern World
Roy S. Gutterman*
Calling someone a liar is an age-old epithet. Depending on the context, calling someone a liar could be defamatory, causing harm to a reputation. But, more often than not, calling someone a liar may be simply
an expression of opinion. In some settings, litigation surrounding the
publication also implicates the First Amendment. In recent years, several courts have weighed in on this issue, some with conflicting outcomes.
This Article examines whether accusations of dishonesty or lying in a
modern media world has a defamatory impact.
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INTRODUCTION
“Talk is cheap and lies are expensive.”
– Billie Joe Armstrong1
Accusations of dishonesty or lying, or the act of calling someone a liar are an epithet for the ages. Ordinarily, an insult, even one
as timeless as liar, would be viewed simply as an insult, not worthy
of legal liability. But the impact of imputing dishonesty by calling
someone a liar could have legal consequences under the tort of defamation. For centuries, defamation law has tested the harm to a
person’s reputation after the person is branded a liar, and the standards for liability, harm, and the contextual meaning of the epithet
are, at best, inconsistent and often considered murky. Precedent
testing the liar epithet lacks clear and consistent application across
courts and jurisdictions.
The tort liability surrounding the word “liar” has been litigated
in recent years with mixed and conflicting court rulings. Furthermore, during the 2016 presidential primary campaign, labeling opponents liars practically became a plank in the candidates’ political
platforms.2 Then-presidential candidate Donald Trump even proclaimed that he wanted to change libel laws to make them more
amenable for public figure plaintiffs.3 Because of current standards
under the First Amendment, a political candidate would hardly
have a leg to stand on in court by pressing a defamation claim for
being branded a liar on the campaign trail.4 While this brought the
1

GREEN DAY, Walking Contradiction, on INSOMNIAC (Reprise Records 1995).
Editorial, The Party of Trump and Path Forward for Democrats, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1,
2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/02/opinion/the-party-of-trump-and-the-pathforward-for-democrats.html [https://perma.cc/P93A-AV65]; Katie Zezima, Liar, Liar: A
Charged Word Is Now Common in the GOP Race, WASH. POST (Feb. 19, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/liar-liar-a-charged-word-is-now-common-inthe-gop-race/2016/02/19/96464d34-d63e-11e5-b195-2e29a4e13425_story.html [https://
perma.cc/7DRK-XAHQ].
3
Louis Jacobson, Donald Trump Wrong that New York Times Can’t Be Sued for a ‘Story
that They Know Is False,’ POLITIFACT (Mar. 1, 2016, 1:40 PM), http://
www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2016/mar/01/donald-trump/donaldtrump-wrong-ny-times-cant-be-sued-story-the/ [https://perma.cc/7B59-8XH3].
4
See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964).
2
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discussion of libel law to the forefront of public discourse (at least
for a news cycle), it does little to clarify the standards or the public’s understanding of defamation law.
Outside the political world, though, the question of whether
calling someone a liar is defamatory is more in flux. Three recent
lawsuits emanating from the Bill Cosby sexual assault allegations
have put “liars” and accusations of lying in play.5 One recent case
involving a prominent college basketball coach stands out as an example of how courts can apply, or misapply, a range of precedent
regarding the term liar.6
Calling someone a liar has never been a nice thing to say. As an
insult, it immediately casts doubt on every aspect of the target’s
integrity, self-worth, and being. Insults, while not endearing, do not
necessarily rise to the level of defamation.7 The tort of defamation
provides a civil remedy to protect people from false statements that
may harm one’s reputation.8 Reputational protection has ancient
roots, and tort law in a civil society provides a financial remedy to
those whose reputations have been harmed by false statements.9
Much like humanity itself, the law of defamation has evolved and
will continue to develop.10 However, calling someone a liar strad5

See Hill v. Cosby, 15-CV-1658, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15795 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 9,
2016), aff’d, No. 16-1362, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 22199 (3d Cir. Dec. 14, 2016);
Complaint at 4, Green v. Cosby, 99 F. Supp. 3d 223 (D. Mass. 2015) (No. 14-30211MGM); Amended Complaint at 12–15, Costand v. Cosby, 232 F.R.D. 494 (E.D. Pa.
2006) (No. 05-CV-1099) (seeking damages for defamation and defamation per se in count
four of the complaint); see also Sydney Ember & Graham Bowley, Defamation Suits
Against Cosby Point to Peril of Belittling Accusers, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/14/business/media/defamation-suits-against-cosbypoint-to-peril-of-belittling-accusers.html [https://perma.cc/GH7U-KYED].
6
See Davis v. Boeheim, 24 N.Y.3d 262, 271–73 (2014).
7
ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER AND RELATED PROBLEMS
§ 2.4 (4th ed. 2010) (“The distinction between what is merely unflattering, insulting, or
derogatory and what will actually injure reputation is thus crucial. People are expected to
be sufficiently hardy to withstand the occasional jibe or disparaging remark; if each such
statement gave rise to a cause of action, courts would have time for little but defamation
suits.”).
8
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 772 (5th ed.
1984).
9
Id. (noting the tort provided an alternative to duels as a remedy for an offended party
to repair a reputation).
10
See infra Section I.A.
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dles the line between actionable defamation and a statement that
may be immunized by at least the opinion privilege.11
Falsity is the most basic element of defamation.12 In some settings, calling someone a liar may be a clear matter of fact, which
could lead to liability.13 In other settings, this epithet may be more
of a term of art, protected by the opinion privilege.14 In the quartercentury since the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the liability of
publishing that someone is a liar, there has been no shortage of litigation testing this issue.15 More recently, a spate of high-profile
cases has emerged to test this concept.16 In more than a couple cases, the plaintiffs appear to use defamation law, specifically litigating
the allegation of lying, to circumvent both civil and criminal statutes of limitations in the underlying disputes.17
This Article analyzes whether in our contemporary world calling someone a liar has the same defamatory impact it once had.
Part I reviews defamation law and considers what it means to be
called a liar. Part II analyzes the cases in which courts have examined the defamatory impact of the “liar” accusation, paying particular attention to the landmark Milkovich v. Lorain Journal case.
Part II also examines two recent controversies litigating the liar epithet as an end-run around expired statutes of limitations. Finally,
Part III discusses how these defamation issues are handled in modern contexts and in social media.

11

See infra notes 34–40 and accompanying text.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
13
SACK, supra note 7, § 2.4.7.
14
See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990) (holding that a statement that
cannot be proven either true or false may not be held as defamatory).
15
See Air Wis. Airlines Corp. v. Hoeper, 134 S.Ct 852 (2014); Tory v. Cochran, 544
U.S. 734 (2005); Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496 (1991); Milkovich,
497 U.S. at 1; Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986); Herbert v. Lando,
441 U.S. 153 (1979); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S.
448 (1976); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts,
388 U.S. 130 (1967); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
16
See cases cited supra notes 5–6.
17
See id.
12
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I. FALSITY, HONESTY, AND LIABILITY
A. The Law of Defamation and Protecting Reputation
The twin torts of defamation are libel and slander.18 As a matter
of state law, defamation is comprised of four elements: an unprivileged false published statement of fact about the plaintiff that causes harm to the plaintiff’s reputation.19 The standard of proof depends on the plaintiff’s status in the community: A private figure
simply must prove that the statements were published with a degree of negligence, whereas a public official (someone who works
for government or a public figure) must prove that the statements
were published with actual malice, which requires knowledge of
their falsity or reckless disregard for the truth.20
The effects of a defamatory statement include public contempt,
ridicule, aversion, and disgrace.21 According to William L. Prosser
and W. Page Keeton, who wrote the leading treatise on torts, at
common law, “[d]efamation is rather that which tends to injure
‘reputation’ in the popular sense; to diminish the esteem, respect,
goodwill or confidence in which the plaintiff is held, or to excite
adverse, derogatory or unpleasant feelings or opinions against
him.”22 “Personal disgrace” is another important element and all
defamation claims must be adjudged by a “reasonable person.”23
But what constitutes personal disgrace is relative, much like language itself. As language and societal standards evolve, one scholar
described defamation as a “distinctly sociological tort.”24 In his
18

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
Id.; see also Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and
the Constitution, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 691, 720–21 (1986). Post notes that defamation law
protects reputation as a property right, assigning a civil financial remedy to a plaintiff’s
dignity and honor: “Our own social world contains important elements of both market
and communitarian societies. If these tensions resolve themselves, one can expect the
contours of defamation law to become clearer and its doctrines more internally
consistent.” Id.
20
See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964).
21
See Foster v. Churchill, 665 N.E.2d 153, 157 (N.Y. 1996).
22
KEETON ET AL., supra note 8, at 773.
23
Id. at 774–75, 777.
24
Jerome K. Skolnick, Foreword: The Sociological Tort of Defamation, 74 CALIF. L. REV.
677, 677 (1986) (“As a sociological tort defamation also invites a more comprehensive
sociological analysis . . . .”).
19
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update to a 1940s press law guide, a noted media lawyer wrote: Determining defamatory meaning “is not limited to orthodox dictionary definition. It hinges also upon the temper of the times, colloquialisms, connotations, previous and subsequent articles or broadcasts, and matters of common knowledge in the circulation or listening area.”25
For decades (and, perhaps, centuries), plaintiffs had a strong
cause of action for defamation if a newspaper referred to the plaintiff as homosexual. However, today, in most states such a case
would not automatically give rise to a libel per se claim.26 Similarly,
falsely identifying a white person as African-American or mixedrace was at one time an actionable libel.27 Throughout the Red
Scare and well into the Cold War, falsely identifying someone as a
Communist could be defamatory.28 The false allegations of being a
25

PAUL P. ASHLEY, SAY IT SAFELY 14 (3d. ed. 1966). Later, in his chapter of libel per se,
Ashley provided a nearly seven-page list of terms and expressions which could be libel per
se, including such terms as “atheist, Communist, nudist, subversive, ambulance chaser,
humbug, sharp dealing, booze hound, scab, [and] horse thief,” among others. Id. at 19–25.
26
See Stern v. Cosby, 645 F. Supp. 2d 258, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“[Statements
imputing homosexuality are] not defamatory per se merely because they impute
homosexuality . . . .They are, however, nonetheless susceptible to a defamatory
meaning.”); Albright v. Morton, 321 F. Supp. 2d 130, 138 (D. Mass. 2004) (“If this
[c]ourt were to agree that calling someone a homosexual is defamatory per se—it would,
in effect, validate that sentiment and legitimize relegating homosexuals to second-class
status.”); see also Jay Barth, Is False Imputation of Being Gay, Lesbian, or Bisexual Still
Defamatory? The Arkansas Case, 34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 527, 527 (2012); Robert
Richards, Gay Labeling and Defamation Law: Have Attitudes Toward Homosexuality
Changed Enough to Modify Reputational Torts?, 18 COMM. LAW CONSPECTUS 349, 365
(2010).
27
Bowen v. Indep. Publ’g Co., 96 S.E.2d 566, 513 (S.C. 1957) (“Although to publish in
a newspaper of a white woman that she is a Negro imputes no mental, moral or physical
fault for which she may justly be held accountable to public opinion, yet in view of the
social habits and customs deep-rooted in this [s]tate, such publication is calculated to
affect her standing in society and to injure her in the estimation of her friends and
acquaintances. That such a publication is libelous per se is supported by the very great
weight of authority.”); Flood v. News & Courier Co., 50 S.E. 637, 640–41 (S.C. 1905).
(“We therefore hold that these three amendments to the Federal Constitution have not
destroyed the law of this state which makes the publication of a white man as a negro
anything but libel.”); see also Natchez Times Publ’g Co. v. Dunigan, 72 So.2d 681, 683–
84 (Miss. 1954).
28
See Grant v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, Inc., 151 F.2d 733, 735 (2d Cir. 1945); see also
ROBERT H. PHELPS & E. DOUGLAS HAMILTON, LIBEL: RIGHTS, RISKS, RESPONSIBILITIES 68
(Macmillan 1966) (“When Americans and Russians were allies, a report that a man was a
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“Leninist” and “Communist” played a prominent role in the
landmark defamation case Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.29 In his own
memoir of the libel case, Elmer Gertz, a Chicago lawyer who
played a relatively minor role in a separate civil action in a police
brutality case, wrote: “As will appear presently, I filed suit against
Robert Welch, Inc., the parent organization of American Opinion,
charging that it had defamed me by publishing harmful lies impugning my reputation and patriotism.”30 Even descriptions of both poverty31 and extreme wealth,32 at various times, generated defamation claims; whereas currently, a plaintiff who is accused of either
may have a difficult time making a prima facie case.33
Perhaps just as antiquated as misidentifying someone in one of
the aforementioned areas are the descriptions of the defamatory
effect itself. One of the most famous, and widely cited cases on the
impact of a defamatory statement is Kimmerle v. New York Evening
Journal, Inc., which provided a laundry list of words which expose
someone “to public hatred, shame, obloquy, contumely, odium,
contempt, ridicule, aversion, ostracism, degradation or disgrace or
to induce an evil opinion of one in the minds of right-thinking persons, and to deprive one of their confidence and friendly intercourse in society.”34 In the twenty-first century, obloquy, 35 concommunist was held nonlibelous . . . . Now the law is settled, at least for a time, that
charges of Communist affiliation are libelous.”).
29
418 U.S. 323 (1974).
30
ELMER GERTZ, GERTZ V. ROBERT WELCH, INC.—THE STORY OF A LANDMARK LIBEL
CASE 6 (1992). Gertz also noted that the Birchers were “much too quick and careless in
calling people Communists or dupes of Communists. Of course, I was not the sole victim
of this looseness of terminology.” Id. at 45.
31
Martin v. Press Publ’g Co., 93 A.D. 531, 531 (N.Y. 1904). Here, plaintiff was an
educated family man who was accused of being “too poor” and unable to provide for his
family. Id. at 531. The court held these statements were actionable because they “exposed
the person referred to therein to public ridicule and tended to abridge his comfort and to
injuriously alter his station in society and was, consequently, libelous per se.” Id. at 532.
32
See Woolworth v. Star Co., 97 A.D. 525, 526–27 (N.Y. 1904).
33
See Trump v. O’Brien, 29 A.3d 1090, 1097 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011)
(affirming dismissal of defamation claims against author who essentially referred to
businessman as a millionaire rather than a billionaire because the plaintiff was unable to
establish publisher acted with actual malice).
34
186 N.E. 217, 218 (N.Y. 1933).
35
For example, “obloquy” is still on the books in California’s statute defining
defamation, but the law was first enacted in 1872. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 45 (West 2016);
see also Bettner v. Holt, 11 P. 713, 716 (Cal. 1886) (“To expose one to obloquy is to expose
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tumely,36 and odium37 are not words that frequently find their way
into common parlance. Though these words do find a place in
modern defamation cases, they are most often tacked on as part of
the list of the harm caused by the defamatory statement, usually in
citations to Kimmerle.38 The four well-defined categories of defamation per se find various formulations embedded in state law.39
Generally speaking, the categories are: imputing crime, imputing
dishonesty or incompetence in business or trade, imputing a loathsome disease (sexually transmitted infection, HIV, or leprosy), and
imputing unchastity of a woman.40
Similarly, there are specific words and phrases whose very utterances can trigger reputational harm. This issue was litigated all
the way to the Supreme Court.41 For example, “blackmail”42 and
“Southern [law] violator”43 were the centerpiece allegations in two
landmark cases. Generally, the actionability of these types of words
depends not only on the language used, but the context as well.
However, there is perhaps no single epithet that causes more consternation than the word “liar.”
him to censure and reproach as the latter terms are synonymous with the word
‘obloquy.’”).
36
See Schaecher v. Bouffault, 772 S.E.2d 589, 594 (Va. 2015) (stating that defamatory
language “tends to injure one’s reputation in the common estimation of mankind, to
throw contumely, shame, or disgrace upon him . . .” (quoting Moss v. Harwood, 102 Va.
386, 387 (1904))).
37
See White v. Nicholls, 44 U.S. 266, 283 (1845) (“The paper is actionable on its face,
as it charges the plaintiff with things which are calculated to bring public odium upon him:
such as ‘descending to the lowest means.’”); see also Harris v. Minvielle, 19 So. 925, 926
(La. 1896) (“He claims of the defendant the sum of $2,500 for the actual loss and damage
he has suffered by direct injury to his commercial business through the instrumentality of
the slander thus circulated . . . by reason of the mortification, annoyance, public
contempt, and odium it has occasioned on him . . . .”).
38
See generally Karedes v. Ackerley Grp., Inc., 423 F.3d 107, 113 (2d Cir. 2005); Celle
v. Filipino Reporter Enters. Inc., 209 F.3d 163, 177 (2d Cir. 2000).
39
SACK, supra note 7, §§ 2.3–2.4.1.
40
NEIL J. ROSINI, THE PRACTICAL GUIDE TO LIBEL LAW 8–9 (1991).
41
Other categories such as hate speech or fighting words could cause similar rancor,
but fall outside the scope of this research, primarily because these categories, while
potentially punishable through criminal law, are not regarded as defamatory. See generally
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377 (1992); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568 (1942).
42
Greenbelt Co-op Publ’g Ass’n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 7–8 (1970).
43
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256–58 (1964).
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B. The Importance of Being Honest
Before delving into the actionability of the word liar, a look at
honesty is in order. The need for truth, and the importance of having a reputation for being truthful—or, in the converse, of being a
liar—is so high that some philosophers, such as Sissela Bok, believe
that truth-telling keeps civilization from imploding.44 In her seminal book Lying, Bok wrote that society depends on language and language requires truth:
Were all statements randomly truthful or deceptive,
action and choice would be undermined from the
outset. There must be a minimal degree of trust in
communication for language and to be more than
stabs in the dark. This is why some level of truthfulness has always been seen as essential to human society, no matter how deficient the observance of
other moral principles.45
Lying is wrapped up in both ethics and morality—good and
bad, honest and dishonest.46 Thomas Carson, a professor of philosophy, speaks of a “warranty” of truth as a guarantee, or even a
promise, for truth.47 Truth also underpins and guarantees (or aims
to guarantee) honesty in certain professions, such as in the occupations of lawyers, doctors, architects, and other fiduciaries.48 “Honesty is generally regarded as a cardinal virtue, and calling someone
a ‘dishonest person’ is generally taken to be a severe criticism or
condemnation of the person,” Carson wrote.49
From the Bible to Disney,50 the ethical and moral judgments attached to the term liar paint quite a negative impression for the

44

SISSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 19 (Pantheon
Books 1978).
45
Id. at 18.
46
THOMAS CARSON, LYING AND DECEPTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 71 (2010).
47
Id. at 25.
48
Id. at 202–03.
49
Id. at 257.
50
M. HIRSH GOLDBERG, THE BOOK OF LIES: SCHEMES, SCAMS, FAKES, AND FRAUDS
THAT HAVE CHANGED THE COURSE OF HISTORY AND AFFECT OUR DAILY LIVES 15, 27
(1990) (“Lying is such a part of the fabric of our lives that even the Bible story of the
beginning of humanity is filled with lies told by its three protagonists.”).
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perniciousness of lies, lying, and dishonesty.51 Our predilection for
dishonesty has been ridiculed, 52 mocked, and satirized,53 but is also
of such import that calling someone a liar has taken on legal ramifications through libel law.
C. Liar and Legal Liability?
American courts have had difficulty with liability surrounding
allegations of lying for centuries. In 1793, a Connecticut circuit
court could not ascertain the defamatory impact of the statement:
“Captain Riggs is a damned liar and a rogue, and I can prove it.”54
In this case, the defendant admitted to libel, and the trial court ordered a one-pound payment to the plaintiff.55 However, the appellate court was unable to determine whether the case was properly
pleaded in either law or fact, and avoided answering the question
with certitude.56
Later, in the early 1800s, a Boston man was convicted and sentenced to two months in prison for posting statements calling an
auctioneer a “liar, a scoundrel, a cheat and a swindler.”57 Con-

51

RALPH KEYES, THE POST-TRUTH ERA: DISHONESTY AND DECEPTION IN
CONTEMPORARY LIFE 27 (2004) (“All societies must reconcile the fact that lying is
socially toxic with the fact that nearly all their members engage in this practice. Every
belief system does its best to regulate dishonesty with taboos, sanctions, and norms. Few
such systems claim that every lie is always wrong. This would put them too far out of
synch with facts on the ground. Therefore a major task for all belief systems has been to
determine when it’s permissible to tell a lie.”).
52
GOLDBERG, supra note 50, at 22 (“Lying is so prevalent that it has its own day—
April Fools’ Day.”).
53
For example, comedian Stephen Colbert was so skeptical and disdainful of dishonest
claims by politicians that he coined the term “truthiness,” which a year later became the
“word of the year.” See Andrew Adam Newman, How Dictionaries Define Publicity: The
Word of the Year, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/10/
business/media/10oxford.html [https://perma.cc/P6AE-NDA4]; Alessandra Stanley,
Bringing Out the Absurdity of the News, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2005), http://
www.nytimes.com/2005/10/25/arts/television/bringing-out-the-absurdity-of-thenews.html [https://perma.cc/G2EB-TP9V].
54
Kelly v. Riggs, 2 Root 13, 13 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1793).
55
Id. at 13.
56
Id. at 14.
57
Commonwealth v. Clap, 4 Mass. 163, 170 (1808) (“The publication of a libel
maliciously with intent to defame, whether it be true or not, is clearly an offense against
law, on sound principles, which must be adhered to, so long as the restraint of all
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versely, a Pennsylvania judge in 1812 wrote: “Every one knows that
to say of a man that he is a rogue or a liar, is not actionable.”58 A
Virginia court in 1850 ruled the same way.59 On the other hand,
during the same period, a North Carolina doctor’s $200 award of
damages was upheld in a slander case in which he was called a
liar.60 In Indiana, a letter declaring that a man was “a grand liar and
a grand rascal, and deserve to come to the whipping-post or gallows” was held to be defamatory.61 And, a Maryland court ruled
that mitigating evidence may be admitted in defense of a libel case
surrounding a statement that plaintiff was “a degraded scoundrel,
liar and blackguard.”62
Prosser and Keeton cited a handful of ancient and conflicting
cases where questions of honesty were at issue.63 For example, a
1900 Georgia newspaper article that implied that a businessman
was a liar was improperly dismissed,64 with the Georgia Supreme
Court holding: “It is difficult for us to imagine what words would
more fully expose a man to public contempt than to publish him as
being a liar.”65 Meanwhile, the Montana Supreme Court wrestled
with whether calling a teacher a liar could be libel per se,66 and a
tendencies to the breach of the public peace, and to private animosity and revenge, is
salutary to the commonwealth.”).
58
M’Clurg v. Ross, 5 Binn. 218, 219 (Pa. 1812).
59
Moseley v. Moss, 47 Va. 534, 538 (1850) (“Thus it is not actionable to call a man a
villain, cheat, rascal, liar, coward or ruffian . . . where such defamation bears only on the
feelings or general standing or reputation of the party implicated, and the misconduct
imputed has not been made punishable by statute.”).
60
Dudley v. Robinson, 24 N.C. 141, 143–44 (1841).
61
McCoombs v. Tuttle, 5 Blackf. 431, 431 (Ind. 1840).
62
Davis v. Griffith, 4 G. & J. 342, 342 (Md. 1832).
63
See KEETON ET AL., supra note 8, at 771–85.
64
Colvard v. Black, 36 S.E. 80 (Ga. 1900). This case involved a newspaper article
entitled “A Dirty Lie Nailed” about the death of an unnamed man on a train passing
through Georgia. Id. at 81. The court wrote: “[T]he article did, in effect, accuse
petitioner of willfully lying, and was prepared and published for the purpose of exposing
him to public hatred, contempt, and ridicule, to cause his defeat for the legislature, and
that said article did cause such defeat.” Id.
65
Id. at 82. The court cited a case decided by the Supreme Court of Indiana in which
the court concluded that it was libelous to call someone a liar. See id. (citing Hake v.
Brames, 95 Ind. 161 (1884)).
66
Paxton v. Woodward, 78 P. 215 (Mont. 1904). The demand for $5,000 in damages
had been thrown out at trial. Id. at 216–217. The court wrestled with whether the
published statements could be libel per se—whether calling a teacher a liar was of such
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Louisiana doctor recovered $5,000 (later reduced to $500) for being branded a liar.67 In another case, the Supreme Court of Iowa
concluded that a libel claim made by a candidate for county sheriff
should have been sent to a jury.68
In his treatise on defamation, Judge Robert D. Sack articulated
this range of precedent and the ensuing confusion surrounding the
issue, speaking directly to the question:
The terms “lie” and “liar” are frequently used to
characterize statements with which the speaker
vehemently disagrees. If in context the words mean
that the defendant disapproves, it is a protected epithet. If it literally implies that the plaintiff made a
specific assertion or series of assertions knowing
them to be false, it may be actionable.69

weight that it injured him in his profession. Id. at 217. The article called him a “common
liar.” Id. at 216. The issue on appeal focused on a demurrer at trial. The court held: While
the written charge, “We knew that Paxton was a man of many attainments, but did not
know that he was a common liar before,” is in its nature, libelous per se, and needs no
colloquium or innuendo to illustrate its application or meaning, and the vice imputed to
plaintiff by the words standing alone is unqualified, and as broad as language can make it,
yet, if the defamatory language is connected with other language which limits or affects its
meaning, or might tend to mitigate the damage, its construction must be in relation to
such other language, and in arriving at the sense . . . in part at least, to certain statements
contained in the Chronicle. Id. (emphasis added).
67
Smith v. Lyon, 77 So. 896, 904 (La. 1918). The doctor recovered $2,500 for libel
damages following a comment that called him “an assassin of character, a liar, and
unworthy of the respect and esteem of decent and fair-minded people.” Id. Eight months
later, the Louisiana Supreme Court reduced the damages to $500 because the initial
award was later deemed to be excessive. Id.
68
Prewitt v. Wilson, 103 N.W. 365, 367 (Iowa 1905). In this case, the court wrote:
Applying the accepted definition of libel, it is difficult to conceive of any publication more
likely to provoke the victim to wrath, or expose him to public hatred and distrust, or to
deprive him of the benefit of public confidence, than to publish abroad that he is a
common liar whose word, even under the solemnity of an oath, will not be believed by his
acquaintances. Id. Derogatory comments published in the heat of a county sheriff race
may be defamatory either as libel per se if the elements of the tort are met, but it should
have been submitted to a jury. Id. “It is true that, ordinarily, oral words which impute to
another a criminal disposition or charge him with being notoriously untruthful or
unworthy of the respect and confidence of his neighbors are not actionable, but such
imputations written and published are universally held to constitute a libel per se,” the
court wrote. Id. (emphasis added).
69
SACK, supra note 7, § 2.4.7.
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II. IS THIS THE LESSON . . . ?
A. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.
The modern law on defamation coalesces around the Supreme
Court’s decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and the subsequent cases often referred to as the Times’ “progeny.”70 In one of
the progeny cases, Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., the legal question focused on whether calling someone a liar was defamatory.71
This case pitted a legendary Ohio high school wrestling coach
against a small daily newspaper in litigation that spanned nearly
fifteen years.72 The sports columnist wrote that Coach Michael
Milkovich had lied under oath during a hearing.73 Under the headline “Maple beat the law with the ‘big lie,’” the columnist wrote:
It is simply this: If you get in a jam, lie your way
out. . . . Anyone who attended the meet, whether he
be from Maple Heights, Mentor, or impartial observer, knows in his heart that Milkovich and Scott
lied at the hearing after each having given his solemn oath to tell the truth.74
The column wove a theme of pedagogy throughout the piece,
with references that the alleged lies perpetrated by school officials
would leave students with the wrong “lesson.”75 In his conclusion,
the columnist posited a rhetorical question about lying and dishonesty: “Is that the kind of lesson we want our young people learning from their high school administrators and coaches?”76

70

C. Thomas Dienes & Lee Levine, Implied Libel, Defamatory Meaning, and State of
Mind: The Promise of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 78 IOWA L. REV. 237, 240, 281
(1993) (“We submit that Masson and Milkovich, when taken together, provide compelling
support for our central proposition—that every defamation action governed by New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan contemplates a threshold, constitutional inquiry by the court
concerning whether the publication at issue is reasonably capable of bearing a false,
defamatory meaning.”).
71
497 U.S. 1 (1990).
72
Id. at 3.
73
Id.
74
Id. at 4–5 (reprinting column from trial record).
75
Id.
76
Id.
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The underlying facts and the tortuous fifteen-year procedural
history show the complicated nature of the case and how courts
wrestle (literally and figuratively) with the question of whether
such statements could be defamatory.77 The defamatory piece was
actually a sports column written by columnist Ted Diadiun in The
News Herald, a small daily newspaper in suburban Cleveland,
Ohio.78 Diadiun had covered the 1974 high school wrestling meet
between Maple Heights and Mentor High Schools, which devolved
into a melee in which several people were injured.79 Subsequently,
the Ohio High School Athletic Association held a hearing with testimony from Maple Heights Coach Milkovich and Superintendent
H. Don Scott.80 The ensuing controversy included probation for
the team, suspension from the next year’s state tournament, a censure for Milkovich for his role in the melee, and a civil lawsuit that
parents brought against the state athletic association.81
The defamation claim—libel per se—focused on lying, which
in this case would have encompassed lying under oath in a judicial
proceeding.82 Milkovich argued that the column accused him of
committing the crime of perjury, which was “an indictable offense
in the state of Ohio, and damaged [the] plaintiff directly in his lifetime occupation of coach and teacher.”83 The defamation
precedent, Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., as well as Superintendent
Scott’s separate libel lawsuit, added additional wrinkles to the case

77

See generally DAVID A. ELDER, DEFAMATION: A LAWYER’S GUIDE § 8:22 (1993).
Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 4. The named defendant, the Lorain Journal, was the parent
company for the News-Herald.
79
Id. at 3–4.
80
Id. at 4.
81
Id.
82
Id. at 6–7; see also Milkovich v. News-Herald, 473 N.E.2d 1191, 1197 (Ohio 1984)
(“The plain import of the author’s assertions is that Milkovich, inter alia, committed the
crime of perjury in a court of law.”), overruled by Scott v. News-Herald, 496 N.E.2d 699
(Ohio 1986).
83
Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 7. Perjury is defined as: “The willful assertion as to a matter of
fact, opinion, belief or knowledge, made by a witness in a judicial proceeding as part of his
evidence, either upon oath or in any form allowed by law to be substituted for an oath,
whether such evidence is given in open court, or in an affidavit, or otherwise, such
assertion being material to the issue or point of inquiry and known to such witness to be
false, and intended by him to mislead the court, jury, or person holding the proceeding.”
Perjury, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1995).
78
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because the plaintiffs’ status as public figures also came into play.84
To further complicate the analysis regarding opinion, a highly influential decision by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, Ollman v. Evans, was decided in 1984.85
By the time the case reached the Supreme Court, the narrow
question of the defamatory impact of calling someone a liar was eclipsed by the broader question of whether there should be a wholesale privilege for opinion.86 In tracing not only the meaning of defamation and the history of defamation, including an oft-cited passage from Shakespeare’s Othello, the Court delved into defenses
including actual malice under New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, and
later Gertz, as well as fair comment.87 The bulk of Chief Justice
William Rehnquist’s analysis rests on determining whether a
statement is fact or opinion.88 The dispositive factor in the analysis
is whether the speaker makes a statement based on some undisclosed fact or facts.89 Thus, the Court illustrated that the statement, “In my opinion John Jones is a liar,” is really not any different than stating, “Jones is a liar.”90 “Simply couching such statements in terms of opinion does not dispel these implications; and
the statement . . . can cause as much damage to reputation as the
statement, ‘Jones is a liar.’”91
To clarify this analysis, the Court provided three mechanisms,
based on existing precedent, to determine whether a statement
could be actionable as a statement of fact or protected as pure opinions. First, the Court said that a statement on matters of public

84

Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 7 (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974)).
See 750 F.2d 970, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The Ollman court developed a four-prong
analysis to decide if a statement is protected as pure opinion or actionable as defamation:
(1) the specific language used, (2) whether it is verifiable, (3) the general context, and (4)
the broader context. Id.
86
Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 10, 18.
87
Id. at 11–18. Fair comment is a common law qualified privilege also known as the
critic’s privilege, which indemnifies writers for writing bona fide critiques. See SACK,
supra note 7, §§ 4.2.1–4.2.2.
88
Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 18–22.
89
Id. at 18–19.
90
Id.
91
Id. at 19.
85
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concern must be provably false to be defamatory.92 Second, statements that no reasonable person could mistake for fact or “imaginative expression” or “rhetorical hyperbole” cannot be actionable.93
And, third, as a matter of public concern, a statement that “reasonably implies false and defamatory facts regarding public figures,” made with actual malice, can be actionable.94
Thus, the Court held that a “reasonable factfinder” could determine that the published allegations in the column could be defamatory.95 The specific language in the column was not “loose,
figurative, or hyperbolic language” and did more than simply imply
that Milkovich committed perjury.96 The Court held:
We also think the connotation that petitioner committed perjury is sufficiently factual to be susceptible of being proved true or false. A determination
whether petitioner lied in this instance can be made
on a core of objective evidence by comparing, inter
alia, petitioner’s testimony before the [Ohio High
School Athletic Association] board with his subsequent testimony before the trial court.97
In the twenty-five years since the Milkovich decision, scholars
have criticized the precedent for not clarifying the standards for
determining whether a statement is protected opinion or actionable.98 Furthermore, a recent analysis of the case called it “deeply
92

Id. at 19–20. This is the rationale under Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767
(1986). In Milkovich, the court stated: “Hepps ensures that a statement of opinion relating
to matters of public concern which does not contain a provably false factual connotation
will receive full constitutional protection.” Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20.
93
Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20. The Court applied the Bresler-Letter Carriers-Falwell
rationale from a previous line of cases. See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46
(1988); Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974); Greenbelt Co-op. Publ’g Ass’n v.
Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970).
94
Milkovich, 497 U.S at 20–21 (citing Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., 466
U.S. 485 (1984); Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964)).
95
Id. at 21.
96
Id.
97
Id. at 21–22.
98
The Supreme Court, 1989 Term: Leading Cases, 104 HARV. L. REV. 219, 226–27 (1990)
(“The Milkovich Court missed an opportunity to alleviate the uncertainty surrounding
[F]irst [A]mendment protection for opinion. Rather than adopt a uniform test to
determine when a statement is an actionable assertion of fact, the Court articulated vague
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and unworkably confused.”99 The question of whether a statement
is opinion or fact, particularly that in which a plaintiff’s honesty
and integrity is involved is not only confusing, but somewhat artificial.100
B. Two Modern (and Conflicting) Sets of Cases
Two high-profile cases have found their way into the court system, pressing the question of whether calling someone a liar in a
public setting is defamatory. The first case, involving one of the Bill
Cosby accusers, was dismissed.101 The second case, involving a
basketball coach, reached the New York Court of Appeals, the
state’s highest court, and the court ruled that the statement was
defamatory.102 The following sections discuss each case separately.
1. Accusing the Accuser—Hill v. Cosby
The first of the Bill Cosby defamation lawsuits thus far, Hill v.
Cosby, was dismissed by a federal judge who applied Pennsylvania
substantive tort law.103 The plaintiff, Renita Hill, accused the legendary comedian of a range of sexual assaults dating back to the
1980s, when she first met Cosby in the Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania,
area while he was casting young women for a television show.104 A
series of responses and rebuttals by Cosby, his lawyer, and his wife
standards that will allow a multitude of lower court tests to flourish.”); Edward M.
Sussman, Note, Milkovich Revisited: “Saving” the Opinion Privilege, 41 DUKE L.J. 415, 421
(1991) (arguing that the Milkovich decision did not actually change the law of defamation).
99
Len Niehoff & Ashley Messenger, Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Twenty-Five Years
Later: The Slow, Quiet, and Troubled Demise of Liar Libel, 49 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 467,
468 (2016) (arguing that the Milkovich court’s “deeply and unworkably confused”
opinion limited its subsequent application and influence).
100
T.R. Hager, Recent Development: Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.: Lost Breathing
Space—Supreme Court Stifles Freedom of Expression by Eliminating First Amendment
Opinion Privilege, 65 TUL. L. REV. 944, 951–52 (1991) (arguing that the murky opinion’s
“artificial dichotomy” between opinion and fact will stifle columnists and editorial
writers and lead to a chilling effect for fear of liability).
101
Hill v. Cosby, No. 15-CV-1658, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15795 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 9,
2016), aff’d, No. 16-1362, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 22199 (3d Cir. Dec. 14, 2016).
102
Davis v. Boeheim, 22 N.E.3d 999, 1001 (N.Y. 2014).
103
Hill, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15795, at *25–27.
104
See Complaint, Hill v. Cosby, No. GD-15-018156 (C.P Allegheny Cty. Oct. 14, 2015).
The case was subsequently removed to federal court. See Hill, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15795, at *1 n.1.
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prompted Hill to retort in court, in a complaint averring that
statements questioning her honesty were tantamount to defamation.105
Pennsylvania courts apply a seven-point list for a prima facie
showing of defamation: (1) defamatory character of the statement;
(2) publication by defendant; (3) application to plaintiff; (4) a defamatory understanding by the recipient; (5) understanding by recipient of “intended” application to plaintiff; (6) special harm as a
result of the publication; and (7) abuse of a conditional privilege.106
The court also noted that the fact-opinion determination is a matter of law.107
Though none of the three published statements explicitly refer
to the plaintiff as a liar, she argued that they questioned her honesty and implied that she was a liar.108 The statements included:
• Martin Singer, a Cosby attorney/representative,
responded to the plaintiff’s initial public media
interview, casting doubt on the plaintiff and her
motives for public statements, calling them
“new, never-before heard claims from women,
who have come forward in the past two weeks
with unsubstantiated, fantastical stories . . . have
escalated far past the point of absurdity. These
brand new claims about alleged decades-old
events are becoming increasingly ridiculous . . .
It makes no sense that not one of these new
women who just came forward for the first time
ever asserted a legal claim back at the time they
allege they had been sexually assaulted.”109
• Cosby, himself, told the newspaper Florida Today:
“I know people are tired of me not saying
anything, but a guy doesn’t have to answer to
innuendos. People should fact-check. People
105

Hill, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15795, at *1–2. Plaintiff also pleaded counts for false
light and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id.
106
Id. at *5–6 (applying 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8343 (West 2016)).
107
Id. at *8.
108
Id. at *12–13.
109
Id. at *11–12.
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shouldn’t have to go through that and shouldn’t
answer to innuendos.”110
• Cosby’s wife, Camille, published a letter to the
editor in The Washington Post which stated that
news organizations “failed to vet” the
accusers.111
The district court held that none of the statements constituted
provable or disprovable fact and constituted opinion, immune from
liability.112 The statements did not imply or allege undisclosed information.113 The court wrote:
This [c]ourt does not find the Martin Singer Statement includes language which implies the existence
of undisclosed defamatory facts about [the p]laintiff.
As such, this [c]ourt considers the Martin Singer
Statement to be purely an opinion proffered by an
attorney who, while actively engaged in the zealous
representation of his client, did not cross the line
and defame the [p]laintiff.114
The court held that the Florida Today statements lacked the
element of harm and simply encouraged the public to “draw its
own conclusions” about the allegations, and that Camille Cosby’s
statements were more critical of the media, rather than the plaintiff.115 The court looked at all three statements together, concluding
that they “did not lead to an inference that [the p]laintiff is a ‘liar
and an extortionist.’”116 “Even assuming the veracity of all that
[the p]laintiff has pled here, the three statements do not support a
claim for defamation by Pennsylvania law,” the court concluded.117
The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal, noting that some of
the underlying statements were indeed based on stated facts even
though a reasonable reader could come to the opposite conclu110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117

Complaint, supra note 104, ¶ 41.
Hill, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15795, at *12.
Id. at *13–14.
Id.
Id. at *15.
Id. at *16–17.
Id. at *18–19.
Id. at *26.
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sion.118 The court held that both the lawyer’s and Camille Cosby’s
comments were clearly opinions.119 The responses to Hill’s accusations came “in the midst of a heated public dispute could not reasonably be understood to imply the existence of any defamatory
facts.”120
2. Full-Court Press in Overtime—Davis v. Boeheim
In the wake of the Jerry Sandusky child abuse scandal at Pennsylvania State University, two brothers in upstate New York alleged that they had been systematically molested as children by a
long-time assistant basketball coach at Syracuse University in the
1980s.121 The case against the assistant coach, Bernie Fine, resurrected decades-old allegations that had been quietly investigated,
possibly ignored, and disregarded years earlier by the university
and law enforcement.122 New allegations arose in 2011 and the national spotlight shone on Syracuse University, its basketball team,
and celebrity coach Jim Boeheim.123 The story, initially reported by
ESPN, created a firestorm of controversy, which included Coach

118

Hill v. Cosby, No. 16-1362, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 22199, at *9, 11 (3d Cir. Dec. 14,
2016).
119
Id. at *8.
120
Id. at *11.
121
Marlen Garcia, Syracuse Fires Associate Basketball Coach Fine, USA TODAY (Nov. 28,
2011), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/college/mensbasketball/story/2011-1127/syracuse-fires-bernie-fine/51426600/1 [https://perma.cc/FQ3Z-MLV4]; Leonard
Greene, ‘Cuse Coach a ‘Perv,’ N.Y. POST (Nov. 18, 2011, 5:00 AM), http://nypost.com/
2011/11/18/cuse-coach-a-perv
[https://perma.cc/7UJH-V3DU];
Pete
Thamel,
Syracuse’s Boeheim Stands by Assistant Accused of Abuse,” N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/18/sports/ncaabasketball/syracuse-assistant-isaccused-of-sexual-abuse.html [https://perma.cc/E28B-2ANA].
122
Joe Nocera, Opinion, It’s Not Just Penn State, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/03/opinion/nocera-its-not-just-penn-state.html
[https://perma.cc/R73Q-QJBW].
123
Erik Brady & Marlen Garcia, Jim Boeheim Under Fire Amid Fallout from Scandal,
USA TODAY (Nov. 29, 2011), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/college/
mensbasketball/story/2011-11-28/syracuse-bernie-fine-boeheim-allegations/51444458/1
[https://perma.cc/S52F-4WNT]; Lynn Zinser, As Case Widens, So Do Concerns for
Syracuse, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/29/sports/
ncaabasketball/as-bernie-fine-case-widens-so-do-concerns-for-syracuse.html
[https://
perma.cc/72PX-QYQW].
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Boeheim vociferously and publicly defending his longtime assistant
coach during a post-game press conference.124
Coach Boeheim questioned the accusers’ motives and charged
them with lying.125 His statements prompted a defamation lawsuit
in a case that had been dormant for decades; the underlying legal
claims were rendered unavailing because the statute of limitations
had long since expired.126 However, new characterizations of the
accusers as liars served as the basis for the Davis-Lang brothers’
defamation claims, which eventually reached the New York Court
of Appeals.127
The plaintiffs, Robert Davis and his stepbrother Michael Lang,
came forward to accuse Syracuse University assistant basketball
coach Bernie Fine of systematically sexually molesting them as
young boys in the 1980s.128 The allegations spurred both a university investigation and widespread media attention, and raised questions about whether the university’s legendary basketball coach Jim
Boeheim had knowledge of the alleged abuse.129
After the controversy picked up steam, Coach Boeheim made
several comments during a post-game press conference accusing
the plaintiffs lying about their allegations and being motivated solely by money.130 These allegations, particularly accusing the brothers of lying, harmed their reputations, they argued.131 The plaintiffs
in the lawsuit isolated five specific statements made by Coach Boeheim:
• This is alleged to have occurred . . . what? Twenty
years ago? Am I in the right neighborhood? . . .
So we are supposed to do what? Stop the presses
124

Joe Nocera, Opinion, Why Syracuse Isn’t Penn State, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/20/opinion/nocera-why-syracuse-isnt-pennstate.html [https://perma.cc/SL6T-Q889]; Lynn Zinser, The Sudden Pivot at Syracuse,
N.Y. TIMES, (Nov. 28, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/29/sports/at-syracusea-sudden-pivot-leading-off.html [https://perma.cc/F9NW-J8S3].
125
See Davis v. Boeheim, 22 N.E.3d 999, 1002 (N.Y. 2014).
126
Id. at 1001.
127
Id. at 1002–03.
128
Id. at 1001.
129
Id. at 1002.
130
Id.
131
Id. at 1003.
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26 years later? For a false allegation? For what I
absolutely believe is a false allegation? I know
[Davis is] lying about me seeing him in his hotel
room. That’s a lie. If he’s going to tell one lie,
I’m sure there’s a few more of them.
• The Penn State thing came out and the kid behind
this is trying to get money. He’s tried before.
And now he’s trying again . . . That’s what this
is about. Money.
• It’s a bunch of a thousand lies that [Davis] has
told . . . He supplied four names to the
university that would corroborate his story.
None of them did . . . there is only one side to
this story. He is lying . . . .I believe they saw
what happened at Penn State, and they are using
ESPN to get money. That is what I believe.
• You don’t think it is a little funny that his cousin
(relative) is coming forward?
• “Boeheim stated that the timing of Lang’s
decision to speak out about his abuse seemed “a
little suspicious.”132
The lawsuit was dismissed on a pre-trial motion and the appellate division affirmed the dismissal in a 3-2 decision; however, the
Court of Appeals of New York reversed. 133 Although the court recited the elements for defamation as a false statement of fact that
exposes a person to “public contempt, hatred, ridicule, aversion or
disgrace,”134 the court analyzed and discussed the application of
the opinion privilege to the statements and quotes at issue.135
The court wrote: “A defamatory statement of fact is in contrast
to ‘pure opinion’ which under our laws is not actionable because
‘[e]xpressions of opinion, as opposed to assertions of fact, are
132

Id. at 1005–06.
See Davis v. Boeheim, 110 A.D.3d 1431, 1431 (N.Y. 2013) (dismissing plaintiffs’
defamation claims as a matter of law under N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3211(a)(7) (McKinney 2016)
because within the context a reasonable reader could construe the statements as opinion
not provable facts), rev’d, 22 N.E.3d 999 (N.Y. 2014).
134
Davis, 22 N.E.3d at 1004 (quoting Thomas H. v. Paul B., 965 N.E.2d 939, 942 (N.Y.
2012)).
135
Id. at 1004–05.
133
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deemed privileged and, no matter how offensive, cannot be the
subject of an action for defamation.’”136 The court also reiterated
the oft-quoted dicta from Gertz—that there is no such thing as a
false idea.137 Of more importance, though, is the court’s reference
to Ollman v. Evans, in which the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals laid
out an important four-prong checklist for determining whether a
published opinion should be afforded protection under the First
Amendment.138
The court also delved into the concept of “mixed opinion,”
which is potentially actionable when it “implies that it is based
upon facts which justify the opinion but are unknown to those reading or hearing it . . . .”139 As a matter of law, applying an “average
person” standard, the court narrowed its analysis and application:
This requirement that the facts upon which the opinion is based are known “ensure[s] that the reader
has the opportunity to assess the basis upon which
the opinion was reached in order to draw [the reader’s] own conclusions concerning its validity” . . .
.What differentiates an actionable mixed opinion
from a privileged, pure opinion is, “the implication
that the speaker knows certain facts, unknown to
[the] audience, which support [the speaker’s] opinion and are detrimental to the person” being discussed.140
To determine whether a statement should be regarded as pure
opinion or otherwise actionable, the court relied on New York’s
recent precedent from Mann v. Abel.141 Mann sits atop a line of cas-

136

Id. at 1004 (quoting Mann v. Abel, 885 N.E.2d 884, 886 (N.Y. 2008)).
Id. (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339–40 (1974)).
138
See id. (citing Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 976 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Steinhilber v.
Alphonse, 501 N.E.2d 550, 552 (N.Y. 1986)).
139
Id. (quoting Steinhilber, 501 N.E.2d at 552).
140
Id. (quoting Steinhilber, 501 N.E.2d at 553; Silsdorf v. Levine, 449 N.E.2d 716, 719
(N.Y. 1983)).
141
See id. at 1005 (citing 885 N.E.2d 884, 886 (N.Y. 2008)). In Mann v. Abel, the court
ruled that a newspaper column labeling plaintiff, among other things, a “political hatchet
Mann” that was “leading the Town of Rye to destruction” should be protected opinion.
Mann, 885 N.E.2d at 885.
137
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es that apply and channel Milkovich to guide courts on opinion.142
The Mann court developed a three-prong analysis—that is reminiscent of but does not cite Ollman—to determine whether a
statement should be regarded as opinion:
(1) [W]hether the specific language in question has a
precise meaning which is readily understood;
(2) [W]hether the statements can be proven true or
false; and
(3) [W]hether either the full context of the
communication in which the statement appears
or the broader social context and surrounding
circumstances are such to signal . . . readers or
listeners that what is being read or heard is likely
to be opinion, not fact.143
The statements that Coach Boeheim made during the press
conference, the court of appeals held, satisfied the first two prongs
under Mann because Boeheim’s statements were factual assertions.144 Specifically, the court wrote:
With respect to the first factor, Boeheim used specific, easily understood language to communicate
that Davis and Lang lied, their motive was financial
gain, and Davis had made prior similar statements
for the same reason. These are clear statements of
plaintiffs’ actions and the driving force for their allegations against Fine. Consideration of the second
factor similarly weighs in favor of treating Boeheim’s statements as factual because the statements
are capable of being proven true or false, as they
142

Mann, 885 N.E.2d at 886; see Immuno AG v. Moor-Jankowski, 567 N.E.2d 1270,
1275–77 (N.Y. 1991) (applying Milkovich to New York state libel law to hold that a critical
letter to the editor of a science journal was protected because of the language and the
context of the speech); see also Thomas H. v. Paul B., 965 N.E.2d 939, 942–43 (N.Y.
2012) (applying Mann in a case involving allegations of child molestation); Brian v.
Richardson, 660 N.E.2d 1126, 1130–31 (N.Y. 1995) (holding an op-ed column to be
privileged as opinion). See generally Gross v. N.Y. Times Co., 623 N.E.2d 1163, 1169–70
(N.Y. 1993) (reversing a pre-answer motion to dismiss libel claim based on protected
opinion privilege).
143
Mann, 885 N.E.2d at 886.
144
Davis, 22 N.E.3d at 1006.
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concern whether plaintiffs made false sexual abuse
allegations against Fine in order to get money, and
whether Davis had made false statements in the
past.145
The court also emphatically discounted these statements as
rhetorical hyperbole.146 Courts consider the contextual analysis to
be the “key” factor in determining whether opinion will be protected.147 Boeheim’s phraseology, “‘I believe,’ [was] insufficient to
transform his statements into nonactionable pure opinion, because
in context, a reasonable reader could view his statements as supported by undisclosed facts despite these denials,” the court
wrote.148
An analysis of the contextual factors also undercut the defendant’s opinion argument because the court believed that Coach
Boeheim was a well-respected, exalted authority in his community
who “as head coach of the team appeared well placed to have information about the charges.”149 Coach Boeheim’s knowledge of
the case and access to the university’s internal investigation and
other documents and materials, which were generally unavailable
to the public, suggested that he had additional or undisclosed
knowledge upon which he spoke, the court noted.150 Furthermore,
Coach Boeheim worked with the alleged abuser, Fine, for decades
had intimate knowledge of this assistant, and claimed that he had
some knowledge about the Davis brothers as well.151
In conclusion, the court wrote: “There is a reasonable view of
the claims upon which Davis and Lang would be entitled to recover
for defamation; therefore, the complaint must be deemed to suffi145

Id.
Id. (“‘[L]iar,’ in context, where it reflects a mere denial of accusations, was personal
opinion and rhetorical hyperbole. Our inquiry, however, does not rest on these two
factors because the third factor in the analysis ‘is often the key consideration in
categorizing a statement as fact or opinion.’” (quoting Indep. Living Aides, Inc. v. MaxiAides, Inc., 981 F. Supp. 124, 128 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); Thomas H., 965 N.E.2d at 943).
147
Id. (quoting Thomas H., 965 N.E.2d at 943). In a footnote, the court also wrote that it
would not need to determine that alternate theory of “mixed opinion.” Id. at 1007.
148
Id.
149
Id.
150
Id.
151
Id.
146
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ciently state a cause of action.”152 Thus, within the context of a
sporting event press conference, off-the-cuff statements by a
speaker regarded as a local celebrity with insider information could
be defamatory.153
APPLYING THE LAW OF DEFAMATION TO THE TERM
‘LIAR’
Even though language and standards for defamation evolve and
reflect contemporary values, it is highly unlikely that calling someone a liar will never be harmful to someone’s reputation. The term
should not be totally removed from the list of potentially defamatory language. Within certain settings, a false imputation of dishonesty can certainly harm someone’s reputation. But, determining the
meaning, liability, and damages is no easy task. The current spate
of cases, seemingly employing tort law to circumvent the statute of
limitations on underlying tort issues or outdated criminal cases,
does not appear on its face to be invoking defamation law in genuine, good-faith manners.
The recent defamation cases pressing the question of whether
there should be liability in calling someone a liar are difficult to rationalize. On one hand, contemporary statements criticizing accusers who have no contemporary recourse in dated cases gives litigants a back door to litigate the past in the present. On the other
hand, being branded a liar for speaking out or stepping forward to
report abuse or wrongdoing, even decades later, takes courage. The
firestorm such accusers endure is part of the rigors of coming forward.
III.

The law of defamation and the impact of a false statement have
never been easy to rationalize. Quantifying harm to reputation can
be speculative, at best, and as much as the landmark New York
152

Id. at 1008.
Rather than pursue further litigation, the parties settled the case for an undisclosed
sum in August 2015. See Chris Carlson, Syracuse, Jim Boeheim Settle Slander Lawsuit with
Bobby Davis, Mike Lang, SYRACUSE.COM (Aug, 6, 2015, 4:00 PM) http://
www.syracuse.com/orangebasketball/index.ssf/2015/08/syracuse_jim_boeheim_settle_
slander_lawsuit_with_bobby_davis_and_mike_land.html
[https://perma.cc/6BZY2VNW].
153
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Times Co. v. Sullivan case has indemnified speakers, particularly
the press, from a host of chilling libel suits by public officials and
public figures, it has also added layers to the argument and raised
questions about not only the meaning of actual malice, but its appropriateness.154 Furthermore, the role of falsity in these discussions of public issues is also part of a long tradition of balancing vigorous, caustic debate on matters of public interest.155
Any litigant or jurist looking for clarity on the defamatory impact of the term “liar,” however, must dig deep for clear guidance.
Milkovich adds to the confusion because every statement must be
assessed within the context.156 Thus, there is no uniformity among
courts—even with the specific charge of calling someone a liar.
What is clear, however, is that accusers and aggrieved victims
whose remedies are long since gone (because the statute of limitations expired for the underlying civil or criminal liability) have been
able to fashion at least prima facie defamation claims by luring parties into a public discussion of the issues.
In some ways, this approach is both a brilliant and opportunistic
legal strategy. This is not intended to diminish the underlying allegations, which the parties never pressed at the time for a variety of
reasons. Unfortunately, with the passage of time, memories fade,
evidence degrades, and witnesses disappear or die, which plays into
the practical rationale for imposing a statute of limitations in the
first place.
The underlying allegations at the heart of these disputes are of
the utmost seriousness and probably should have been thoroughly
investigated and prosecuted at the time of the assaults. As is often
the case, defense in both the courtroom and the court of public
opinion often entails denials and casting the accusers in an unfavorable light.157 Balancing these two competing interests, though,
154

See KEETON ET AL., supra note 8, at 815–16.
See Prewitt v. Wilson, 103 N.W. 365, 367 (Iowa 1905).
156
Niehoff & Messenger, supra note 99, at 468.
157
For example, Flowers v. Carville illustrates the perils and difficulties that an accuser
faces, and how the epithet “liar” among other retorts, can be actionable. See 310 F.3d
1118 (9th Cir. 2002). Here, the response against Gennifer Flowers, who stepped forward
during the 1992 presidential campaign to allege that she had maintained a long-term
extramarital relationship with then-candidate Bill Clinton, was labeled a liar and a fraud,
and accused of doctoring tape recordings by a host of Clinton campaign staffers. Id. at
155
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requires some legal guidance and that guidance comes from Milkovich, a Supreme Court precedent that is murky at best.158
Thus, the context of the utterance “liar” is more dispositive
than the word itself. Referring to a witness who testified as a liar
may be actionable under Milkovich as a factual matter related to
perjury, while a comedian such as Jon Stewart or John Oliver calling a candidate a liar would not be.159 No reasonable person would
expect facts to flow from a comedian. However, the context of a
basketball coach’s off-the-cuff defense of a long-time assistant at a
post-game press conference should not have the same credibility of
a statement made under oath and threat of perjury.160 How much
credibility should or could be afforded to a post-game press conference?
The vast range of inconsistent court decisions does little to settle the question. Recently, courts have come to opposite conclusions in at least two high profile cases testing these issues. In cases
against Bill Cosby, at least one court has rejected a defamation
claim, while others are currently on appeal.161 In New York, the
state’s high court held that a basketball coach’s spontaneous outburst at a post-game press conference, branding two accusers liars,
could be held as defamatory and not opinion because of the weight
of the speaker and the tenor of his comments.
The Davis court cited one of New York’s more recent defamation cases, Thomas H. v. Paul B., in which a plaintiff who had been
accused of child molestation and rape argued that he had been de-

1122–28. The court partially reversed a motion to dismiss, writing that Flowers deserved
her day in court to prove that the statements about her were defamatory and published
with actual malice. Id. at 1133.
158
See Hager, supra note 100, at 951–52.
159
See New Times, Inc. v. Isaacks, 146 S.W.3d 144, 157–58 (Tex. 2004) (“In a case of
parody or satire, courts must analyze the words at issue with detachment and dispassion,
considering them in context and as a whole, as the reasonable reader would consider
them.”).
160
See generally Michel v. NYP Holdings, Inc., No. 14-62649-CIV-COHN/SELTZER,
2015 U.S. Dist Lexis 38896, at *9–10 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 4, 2015) (applying Davis v. Boeheim
to an analysis of the context of a potentially defamatory statement, paying particular
attention to the tabloid’s gossip pages).
161
See sources cited supra note 5.
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famed.162 Deciphering statements made in such a controversy may
present a nearly “impossible” task for a court.163 The court more
clearly articulated the hazards:
Even when an accusation involves serious criminal
conduct, differentiating between fact and opinion is
not necessarily an easy endeavor. At first blush, a
statement such as “plaintiff is a thief” certainly appears capable of being proven true or false. But the
overall context in which such words are used may
cloud their potentially defamatory nature.164
If determining whether a statement questioning a person’s honesty in a traditional setting or in legacy media is confusing and potentially conflicting,165 then modern media—particularly social
media—is even worse because it is rife with mixed messages and a
blurry context that courts are only beginning to rationalize.166
Whether the context provided by social media platforms provides
facts or opinion leaves courts vexed. One state trial court judge,
ruling on social media posts that included an allegation that the
plaintiff was a “liar,” noted the ease with which vitriolic and potentially defamatory statements find an easy home online.167
In Technovate LLC v. Fanelli, the court held that while comments critical of the quality of the workmanship were protected as
pure opinion, statements accusing the company’s owner of a

162

See Davis v. Boeheim, 22 N.E.3d 999, 1004–07 (N.Y. 2014); see also Thomas H. v.
Paul B., 965 N.E.2d 939, 941–42 (N.Y. 2012).
163
Thomas H., 965 N.E.2d at 943.
164
Id. at 942–43.
165
See Niehoff & Messenger, supra note 99 (discussing Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.,
497 U.S. 1 (1990)); see also Bradford J. Kelley, Comment, Tortious Tweets: A Practical
Guide to Applying Traditional Defamation Law to Twibel Claims, 73 LA. L. REV. 559, 588
(2013) (“Trial courts will be better served to continue to apply traditional defamation
law, regardless of the publication medium.”).
166
See Joshua Azriel & Charles Mayo, Fifty Years After New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
and Forty Years After Gertz v. Welch: How These Twentieth Century Supreme Court Rulings
Impact Twenty-First Century Online Social Media Libel Claims, 20 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L.
191 (2014).
167
Technovate LLC v. Fanelli, No. 003713/15, 2015 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 3394, at *11–12
(Civ. Ct. Sept. 10, 2015).
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“scam” and being “a liar” were sufficiently factual and harmful.168
The court awarded the plaintiff $1,000 in damages.169 The new
medium, and thus the context, provides courts with great difficulty
assessing defamation. The court explained:
The courts have been struggling with the application of the traditional analysis of defamation to the
Internet. As noted in Sandals Resorts International
Ltd. v. Google, Inc., the culture of the Internet is characterized by a more freewheeling, anything-goes
style of writing where bulletin boards and chat
rooms may be the repository of a wide range of casual, emotive, and imprecise speech where the readers of the offensive statements do not necessarily
attribute to them the same level of credence they
would to statements made in other contexts. On-line
speech often is characterized by the use of slang,
grammatical mistakes, spelling errors, and a general
lack of coherence. Many, if not, all of which exist in
defendant’s postings.170
In one of the first expositions on defamatory liability associated
with Twitter, legal columnist Julie Hilden described how the lines
between opinion and fact “blur” on the social media platform.171
Twitter’s immediacy and brevity, as well as the use of slang and
direct contact with an infinite audience, differentiate the platform
from traditional media.172 She wrote:
To try to get the protection of the privilege for opinion based on disclosed fact, however, defendants
may ask courts to view certain sets of tweets—those
that appeared closely enough to each other in time
168

Id. at *4, *16–17. (“[D]efendant’s statements in regard to his honesty in business
transactions qualified as defamation per se entitling him to general damages without proof
of special harm.”).
169
Id. at *17.
170
Id. at *10 (citation omitted).
171
Julie Hilden, Should the Law Treat Defamatory Tweets the Same Way as it Treats
Printed Defamation, JUSTIA (Oct. 3, 2011), https://verdict.justia.com/2011/10/03/
should-the-law-treat-defamatory-tweets-the-same-way-it-treats-printed-defamation
[https://perma.cc/5R25-5UN9].
172
Id.
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to make it likely that they were read together by followers—as, in effect, one statement. In my view,
that seems like a reasonable thing for a court to do.
(Here, too, empirical evidence could be gathered, by
contacting followers—or a sample of them—to see
if they did, indeed, read every one of a series of related tweets, or if they just read the lone tweet that
the plaintiff has now put at issue.)173
While Hilden offered a range of solutions, including declaring
socially accepted textual or typographical symbolism, such as colorcoding statements intended to be humorous or sarcastic, or the
creation of a symbol to indicate opinion like the four-character abbreviation of “In My Humble Opinion” (“IMHO”) which sometimes prefaces statements, Hilden predicted a future rife with more
libel lawsuits.174 Perhaps Hilden was writing sarcastically, but much
like the message in cyberspace, the tone did not fully translate.
Though media accounts have publicized a handful of highprofile celebrity Twitter defamation suits, judicial opinions and
guidance on these “twibel” cases are scant.175 One of the first
Twitter libel lawsuits involved rock star Courtney Love, who
wrote, among other tweets, that a designer who she had a tiff with
was a prostitute who had stolen from her.176 In a series of tweets,
Love also accused the plaintiff of drug use and losing custody of a
child.177 Thus, the lying epithet, likely played a minor role in the
litigation compared to the other libels. But it was still a component
of the lawsuit and a $430,000 settlement, which a California appeals court affirmed, ruling that the publicly fought feud was not a
matter of public interest worthy of dismissal on First Amendment
grounds.178
173

Id.
Id. Law professor Lili Levi humorously coined the word “twibel” to describe libel
lawsuits emanating from Twitter. See Lili Levi, Social Media and the Press, 90 N.C. L. REV.
1531, 1574–75 (2012) (discussing libel lawsuits based on tweets by Courtney Love and
Kim Kardashian).
175
Levi, supra note 174.
176
See Simorangkir v. Cobain, No. B254895, 2015 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1442, at *7–
8 (Feb. 26, 2015).
177
Id.
178
Id. at *16–19.
174
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One scholar analyzing the tensions relating to social media
wrote:
Because of the informal nature of Twitter, reasonable readers of most Twitter feeds “do not understand ‘tweets’ to be conveying factual information.” In evaluating whether Love’s comments were
factual (and therefore likely libelous), or opinion
(which is more protected and less likely libelous),
the California Courts examined the “context, including the nature of the platform.” Thus, because
opinion-based speech receives much greater First
Amendment protection than fact-based speech, this
will be a crucial point of analysis in determining
whether tweets are defamatory.179
Lying and imputing dishonesty also infiltrates social media,
such as Facebook,180 and consumer complaint websites, which raises questions of common law defamation as well as other issues,
such as trade disparagement and intellectual property infringement.181 The review website Yelp has tested the old law for reputation management within a modern media context.182
An online post calling a realtor a “liar” was among the statements challenged in a defamation lawsuit, Shiamili v. Real Estate
179

Ellyn M. Angelotti, Twibel Law: What Defamation and its Remedies Look Like in the
Age of Twitter, 13 J. HIGH TECH. L. 433, 472–73 (2013) (citing Sam Bayard, First Twitter
Libel Suit, Starring Courtney Love, DIGITAL MEDIA L. PROJECT (Mar. 30, 2009),
http://www.dmlp.org/blog/2009/sam-bayard/first-twitter-libel-suit-starring-courtneylove [https://perma.cc/YU46-XJYT]).
180
See generally Armstrong v. Shirvell, 596 Fed. App’x 433 (6th Cir. 2015); Vizant
Techs., LLC. V. Whitchurch, No. 15-431, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2112 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 8,
2016); Runyan v. Fey, No. 15-CV-00009-RBJ-CBS, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 170645 (D.
Colo. Dec. 22, 2015).
181
See generally Cassandra Burke Robertson, Online Reputation Management in Attorney
Regulation, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 97 (2016).
182
While websites that allow third-parties or users to post or publish information on the
platform are immune from liability under section 230 of Communications Decency Act
(“CDA”), the authors of critical commentary have found themselves in court defending
their statements. See Braverman v. Yelp Inc., No. 158299, slip op. at 793 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Feb. 24, 2014), aff’d, 128 A.D.3d 568 (N.Y. 2015); see also DERIGAN SILVER, Defamation,
in SOCIAL MEDIA AND THE LAW: A GUIDEBOOK FOR COMMUNICATION STUDENTS AND
PROFESSIONALS 23, 44 (Daxton R. Stewart ed., 2013) (suggesting that critical statements
posted on Yelp might be afforded protection under the fair comment privilege).

2017]

LIAR! LIAR?

285

Group of New York, Inc., which named a New York City real estate
industry website among the defendants.183 Because of section 230
of the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”), the case against
the website was dismissed because it was viewed as a passive conduit for third-party comments.184 However, the court also added
that no reasonable reader could construe the statements, which
were undoubtedly offensive, as fact or defamatory.185 Some of
those statements might have even been construed as satirical.186
Meanwhile, a Washington state appellate court dismissed online
postings which included a list of abusive insults, including “liar”
because no reasonable viewer could construe the statements as factual, not opinion.187 Even a website named “liarscheatersus.com,”
which encouraged people to post comments about failed relationships, could be viewed as rhetorical hyperbole and opinion.188
In the modern world, perhaps courts can find refuge with old
legal standards. Milkovich has never been an easy precedent to apply, except perhaps with its Hustler v. Falwell rhetorical hyperbole
rationale (the more outrageous the epithet, the less reasonable it is
to accept for its truthfulness).189 Applying the Ollman prongs may
be useful: (1) does the language have a precise meaning; (2) can the
language used be proven true or false; and (3) what is the full context of the statement?190 Though the Ollman test may seem more
accessible and workable in determining whether a statement should
be regarded as factual or pure opinion, especially in an academic
setting, such an analysis may be of little consolation to a potential
183

952 N.E.2d 1011, 1014 (N.Y. 2011).
Id. at 1018–19. This was the New York Court of Appeals’ first ruling on the CDA.
See id. at 1020.
185
Id. at 1019–20.
186
Id.
187
See Life Designs Ranch, Inc. v. Sommer, 364 P.3d 129, 135–36 (Wash. 2015).
188
Couloute v. Ryncarz, No. 11-CV-5986 (HB), 2012 U.S. Dist. Lexis 20534, *18–20
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2012) (“Defendants note, liarscheatersus.com is ‘specifically intended
to provide a forum for people to air their grievances about dishonest partners.’ The
average reader would know that the comments are ‘emotionally charged rhetoric’ and the
‘opinions of disappointed lovers.’ Of course the internet makes it more likely that a
greater number of people will read comments such as these, and thereby amplify the
impact they may have on a person, but this does not change the underlying nature of the
comments themselves.”).
189
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20 (1990).
190
Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
184
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plaintiff who has just been branded a liar in a speech, a press conference, an editorial, or a post on social media.
A wholesale judicial declaration that social media or online
comments sections should never be taken seriously as factual, or
that no reasonable person should view such areas as fact, would
neuter defamation law. Perhaps the only real solace a potential defamation plaintiff could take rests in the fact that being branded a
“liar” in tweets, comments, or reviews is often accompanied by
more derogatory and damaging statements. But, this is hardly a viable judicial standard.
CONCLUSION
The law of defamation revolves around the meaning of words.
Language, particularly that which lowers someone’s esteem in
their community or causes harm to his or her reputation, must be
weighed against the context of that utterance. Even with the evolution of language, perhaps no epithet still tests these issues more
than calling someone a liar. As much as observers might want a
simple yes/no answer regarding liability surrounding the word liar,
there is no one-size-fits-all determination of liability or harm.
Courts wrestling with these issues in interpersonal communications, traditional legacy media (such as newspapers or broadcasters), and modern social media must pay particular attention to the
context in which the speech emerged.
A spate of recent cases testing the liability of the term liar has
emerged amid several high-profile public scandals. The plaintiffs in
these cases, victims of abuses for which the statute of limitations
had long since expired, have found new venues to seek justice
through the tort law of defamation—litigating the liability and
harm associated with being called a liar. While defamation law protects a person’s reputation, it should not be used as a back door
when other civil and criminal remedies have expired. Longstanding Supreme Court precedent reiterates the importance of
context in this analysis because sometimes calling someone a liar is
nothing more than opinion. Thus, in many venues, calling someone
a liar may be offensive or hurtful, but falls short of being defamatory. And, that is the truth.

